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Non-Technical Summary 
Multimarket contact is perceived to be one of those factors, which can facilitate and sustain 
implicit collusion. This multimarket contact effect has got relatively little attention in the 
previous literature, although the theoretical and empirical discussion has been revived in the 
1990s after Bernheim and Whinston (1990) seminal work. In this paper the authors state that 
the multimarket contact may lessen the degree of the competition between the rivals, as the 
multiple competitors are more likely to recognize their mutual dependence, and to sustain 
collusion across the range of markets, in which they meet. The existing empirical studies, 
which are mostly done for airlines and banking industry, have failed to give conclusive 
evidence about the existence, sign and significance of the multimarket contact effect on 
collusion. 
The present paper attempts to develop new approaches to study the interdependence of firm 
behaviour across markets, especially in the context of differentiated products industries. In 
particular, the paper looks at whether the multimarket contact facilitates collusive 
(cooperative) arrangements, or reduces firm competition intensity.  
The multimarket contact effects are studied within a structural oligopoly model for 
differentiated products for the US automobile market. The automobile industry is 
characterized by extensive multimarket contact within the geographical and product market 
context where different firms may have different “spheres of influence”. The results of the 
paper lends some support to the fact that multimarket contact influences competition in the 
automobile markets and increases the firms’ strategic interdependence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der Multi-Markt-Kontakt (‚multimarket contact’) ist eines der Faktoren, der zu impliziten 
Kollusion führen könnte. Dieser Multi-Markt-Kontakt-Effekt wurde in der früheren Literatur 
relativ wenig untersucht, obwohl die theoretische und empirische Diskussion nach der 
grundlegenden Studie von Bernheim und Whinston (1990) in den 90er Jahren wieder 
aufgenommen wurde. In diesem Papier behaupten die Autoren, dass der Multi-Markt-Kontakt 
zu einer Verringerung der Wettbewerbsintensität zwischen den rivalisierenden Unternehmen 
führen kann, weil es wahrscheinlicher ist, dass die mehrfachen (multiplen) Wettbewerber die 
wechselseitigen Abhängigkeiten erkennen, und sich kollusiv auf den Märkten, wo sie sich 
begegnen, verhalten. Den existierenden empirischen Studien, die meistens für die 
Luftfahrtindustrie und Banken durchgeführt wurden, ist es nicht gelungen, die beweiskräftige 
Aussage bezüglich der Existenz, des Zeichnens und der Signifikanz des Multi-Markt-Kontakt-
Effektes auf die Kollusion zu machen.   
Der Hauptzweck dieser Studie ist die Entwicklung von neuen Methoden zur Erforschung 
der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit des Unternehmensverhaltens, besonders im Kontext der 
Industrien mit heterogenen Produkten. Insbesondere wird untersucht, ob die Zunahme von 
Multi-Markt-Kontakten zwischen den rivalisierenden Unternehmen zu einer Verringerung der 
Wettbewerbsintensität oder sogar zu impliziten Kollusion zwischen den Unternehmen führt.    
Die Multi-Markt-Kontakt-Hypothese wird für den US-Automobilmarkt durch die 
Schätzung eines strukturellen Oligopolmodells für heterogene Produkte untersucht. Die 
Automobilindustrie wird durch den hohen Grad an Multi-Markt-Kontakt auf den 
geographischen und Produktmärkten bezeichnet. Auf diesen Märkten können die 
rivalisierenden Unternehmen verschiedene Einflussbereiche (‚spheres of influence’) haben. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie unterstützen die Hypothese, dass der Multi-Markt-Kontakt den 
Wettbewerb auf den Automobilmärkten beeinflussen und die strategische Interdependenz der 
Unternehmen verstärken könnte.  
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1. Introduction 
Multiple competition, or multimarket contact rivalry, has become very important in the 
contemporary competitive strategy literature. Multimarket contact is perceived to be one of 
those factors, which can facilitate and sustain implicit collusion. This multimarket contact 
effect has got relatively little attention in the previous literature, although the theoretical and 
empirical discussion has been revived in the 1990s after the seminal paper by Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990). 
The main objective of this paper has been to verify the existence and significance of the 
effect of the multimarket contact on the tacit collusion, through developing a new 
methodology, or approaches. The paper addresses two major issues: how to conduct the test 
of the mutual forbearance hypothesis in principle (to try to solve the problem of the previous 
inconclusive empirical evidence and address the weaknesses of the previous empirical 
studies), and how to implement a test using particular data (especially when some 
multimarket contact measure may not be readily available, or when the desirable situation for 
observing the multimarket contact effects on cooperative behaviour is not observable, 
however, the multimarket contact is present in an industry of interest). 
Competition policy has exhibited growing interest in empirical oligopoly models to 
quantify the competitive effects of mergers, study market conduct, estimate the welfare 
effects of the introduction of new products, investigate deregulation effects, etc. In this paper, 
the multimarket contact effects on collusion are tested on the basis of the structural oligopoly 
model for differentiated products and estimated on the basis of the market-level data on 
prices, quantities, and product characteristics. The differentiated products demand is derived 
from the discrete choice framework. With a complete specification of the demand and cost 
conditions, the hypothesis of the mutual forbearance and of the traditional view of no 
interdependence of the firm behaviour across the markets can be tested directly. Different 
hypotheses on the firms’ equilibrium interactions, including the hypothesis of collusive 
behaviour due to multimarket contact, are developed and tested in this paper. Non-nested 
procedures and goodness-of-fit criteria are then applied to choose between different models of 
the firm behaviour. 
The multimarket contact effects on oligopolistic coordination are tested for the automotive 
industry, on the basis of the product-level data for the US light vehicles market for 2001-
2003. The automotive industry appears to be an interesting case for studying the above 
mentioned effects as it is characterized by extensive multimarket contact both across the 
product and geographical markets dimensions. The industry has undergone a significant 
consolidation process, which resulted in about 13 major independent OEMs, which are 
present in virtually all market segments and across different geographic regions. In this paper 
the multimarket contact is defined on a product segment level in the light vehicles market 
within one geographical market, namely the US market. 
The automotive industry has become a subject of empirical studies at the product level 
starting with Bresnahan (1981), and later a number of studies appearing after Berry (1994) 
and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) papers, relying on the advances in the discrete choice 
literature. Some automotive industry papers study the equilibrium firm interactions (e.g., 
Bresnahan, 1981, 1987, Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995, Verboven, 1996, 1999, Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1999, Sudhir, 2001, Goldberg and Verboven, 2001, Brenkers and 
Verboven, 2006), but only a few of them study (directly, or indirectly) collusive behaviour 
(e.g., Bresnahan, 1981, 19872, Verboven, 1996, Sudhir, 2001, Goldberg and Verboven, 
                                                 
2  Bresnahan (1981) studies the firm behaviour in the American car market in 1977 and 1978 and estimates 
the price-cost margins during this period of time, as well as the impact of import competition on the 
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20013). In the automotive industry studies, which are based upon the estimation of the 
structural oligopoly models, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is usually assumed, which may be not 
quite correct as the repeated interaction among the automotive firms may destroy the Bertrand 
outcome. The concentrated structure of the industry could also foster cooperative behaviour. 
In some studies, Cournot equilibrium, or some “mixed” equilibrium (i.e., price and quantity 
competition for different sets of firms) is estimated (e.g., Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995, 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1999). 
The literature on the firm behaviour pattern in different automotive market segments is 
scarce, the only exception is the paper by Sudhir (1991).4 The author studies the competitive 
pricing behaviour in the US automobile market in 1981-1990 and competitive interactions in 
each segment of the market using the conjectural variation approach. The author finds the 
following firm behaviour patterns: aggressive behaviour in the minicompact and subcompact 
segments, cooperative behaviour in the compact and mid-size segments, and Bertrand pricing 
behaviour in the full-size segment. As already mentioned by Bernheim and Whinston (1990), 
in case of heterogeneous products there may be different degrees of collusion in different 
markets due to the multimarket contact based on the demand and cost conditions. 
In this paper I have found that multimarket contact may influence competition in the 
automobile market and increase the firms’ strategic interdependence. This effect is, however, 
difficult to disentangle from the effect of the market concentration in the US automobile 
market (dominance of the market by the American Big Three) on the firm behaviour. In other 
words, it is difficult to argue whether coordination is due to market concentration, or due to 
multimarket contact, or if it can be attributed to both. Concentration is argued to foster the 
slack, which is transferred through the multimarket contact. 
This paper is organized in the following way. First I discuss theoretical and empirical 
literature related to multimarket contact effects on firm behaviour. After an overview of 
multimarket and multi-firm (multi-brand) linkages in the US automobile market, I move to 
the description of the empirical oligopoly model, multimarket contact test methodology, and 
estimation procedure. The paper concludes with the presentation and discussion of the results. 
2. Multimarket contact theory and empirics 
2.1. Theory 
Multimarket contact (alternatively, multimarket/multiple competition, multipoint rivalry) can 
be observed in a number of situations: a firm can produce multiple products, or a single-
product firm can operate in a number of geographical markets or a conglomerate may be 
represented along several business lines (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). It is perceived to be 
one of those factors, which can facilitate and sustain implicit collusion, or facilitate 
oligopolistic consensus among firms engaged in noncooperative rivalry. From the theoretical 
point of view, there have been opposing opinions on the impact of the multimarket contact on 
collusion. On one hand, there is a mutual forbearance hypothesis by Edwards (1955), defined 
as the situation when the multimarket contact leads to more cooperation in all the markets that 
are common to the rivals (i.e., strong interdependence across the markets). Besides, there is a 
view similar to the mutual forbearance hypothesis, “linked oligopoly theory”, developed for 
                                                                                                                                                        
margins. Bresnahan (1987) investigates a supply-side shock in the American automobile market in 1995 
and attributes this shock to the price war, while in the neighbouring years the firm behaviour could be 
characterized as collusive. 
3  Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) study the European car market. 
4  Brenkers and Verboven (2006) estimate correlation parameters (on the basis of two-level nested logit) 
across the market segments for the European car market and make some inferences about the competition 
pattern in each market segment on the basis of these estimated correlation parameters. 
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the banking industry by Solomon (1970). According to this theory, the degree of linkage 
across the (adjacent) markets, or the presence of a firm in the multiple markets, is one of the 
important determinants of performance in the oligopolistic environment. Oligopolistic 
coordination can be strengthened as a result of the multimarket contact. 
On the other hand contrary to Edwards (1955) and Solomon (1970), according to the more 
traditional point of view, coordination is due to market concentration (internal factor, 
structure of the market/technology), and not due to multimarket contact (external factor, firm 
behaviour) (Scherer and Ross, 1990). The increased concentration in the market creates 
barriers to entry and expands the possibilities for the interfirm coordination, thus, lowering 
the rates of entry and exit from the market. According to the strongest form of this approach, 
the multimarket firms behave like independent firms in each market, where competition is 
determined only by those market factors. 
In general, this aspect of multiple competition, namely the relationship between the 
multimarket contact and firm behaviour, in particular, reduction in the firm competition 
intensity/facilitation of the mutual forbearance5, or increasing in general the firms’ strategic 
interdependence (multiplicity of products and markets leading to strategic behaviour that 
otherwise would not be present) has got relatively little attention in the previous literature.  
The more recent theoretical literature on the mutual forbearance hypothesis is represented 
by the contributions by Bernheim and Whinston (1990), Verboven (1998), Spagnolo (1999), 
and Matsushima (2001). Bernheim and Whinston (1990) state that the multimarket contact 
may lessen the degree of the competition between the rivals, as the multiple competitors are 
more likely to recognize their mutual dependence and to sustain collusion across the range of 
markets in which they meet. The firms can distribute their market power through pooling the 
incentive constraints across the markets (the so-called strategic effects): they can decrease 
prices and give up profits in the more collusive markets in order to facilitate collusion, raise 
prices and increase profits in the more competitive markets, as long as their total profits are 
maximized. 
Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer (1985) study the strategic interaction of firms due to 
cost- and demand-based linkages across markets. They just state that demand- and cost-
related linkages lead to linkages in strategic interaction, however, do not analyze whether 
multimarket contact may facilitate collusive outcomes. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) do not 
assume these linkages in order to highlight the strategic linkages across markets. They point 
out several conditions that lead to multimarket contact fostering collusion: different firms, 
different markets, and scale economies. “Spheres of influence” could be developed when 
there are production cost differences across firms, or there are scale economies, which allow 
the firms to have higher prices and profits. The maintenance of collusive prices may be 
facilitated in case of a geographically-based reciprocal trade of output. There is an incentive 
towards multimarket diversification when the markets could be subjected to random shocks 
that are imperfectly correlated. 
Verboven (1998) looks at the relationship between localized competition, multimarket 
operation and collusive behaviour. In case of localized competition, firms meet with different 
sets of rivals. As a result, there are problems of private information concerning the past 
actions of the firms. Strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments should be adopted by 
firms because of the resulting communication problems. Spagnolo (1999) gives the more 
general conditions for the effect of the multimarket contact on collusion, and argues that 
multimarket contact always leads to collusion, irrespective of asymmetries between markets 
                                                 
5  The terms "mutual forbearance hypothesis", "multimarket contact hypothesis", "linked oligopoly theory" 
are synonyms in this paper as they are used by different authors to explain essentially the same 
phenomenon. 
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and firms, when a firm’s static objective function is strictly concave, which makes the market 
supergames interdependent: a firm’s payoff in each market is dependent upon how it is doing 
in the other markets. Matsushima (2001) investigates the issue of the multimarket contact 
under imperfect monitoring, and finds support for the existence of the multimarket contact 
effect on collusion as well. 6 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
There have been several experimental studies on the effects of the multimarket contact on 
collusion. For example, Phillips and Mason (1992) find the experimental support for the 
game-theoretic predictions by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In another study, Phillips and 
Mason (1996) state that due to the multimarket contact, regulatory action in one market will 
impact the behaviour of firms in the other market. These studies are based upon the 
comparison of the firm behaviour under single-market and multi-market situations. In 
particular, Phillips and Mason (1992) first analyze a distinct duopoly setting without any 
multimarket contact, and then they observe the behaviour of the subject pairs in the 
experimental markets. 
The existing empirical studies (e.g., Heggestand and Rhoades, 1978, Scott, 1982, Evans and 
Kessides, 1994, Parker and Röller, 1997), which were mostly conducted for the airline and 
banking industry, have failed to give conclusive evidence about the existence, sign and 
significance of the multimarket contact effect on collusion. These are mainly the cross-
sectional studies. They concentrate on testing the multimarket contact effect based on the 
construction of some multimarket contact measure on the firm’s performance (i.e., the so-
called reduced-form approach). There have been virtually no studies done on the multimarket 
contact effect on collusion within a structural model of firm behaviour (the only exceptions 
are the papers by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) and Parker and Röller (1997) for the 
homogenous products7). A few studies concentrate on the estimation of the “conjectures” as a 
way to study the mutual forbearance hypothesis, i.e., the reactions of the other firms to the 
actions of the given firm (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller, 19878). The existing empirical studies 
have difficulty in distinguishing between internal (e.g., concentration, demand conditions, 
barriers to entry) and external effects (e.g., multimarket contact) upon the firm performance 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). 
Longitudinal data surrounding deregulatory episodes are sometimes used to study the effect 
of multimarket contact on collusion (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller, 1987, Parker and Röller, 1997). 
Gelfand and Spiller (1987) study the impact of the relaxation of legal entry restrictions in the 
Uruguayan banking sector on the development of multiproduct oligopolistic practices. Parker 
and Röller (1997) use the deregulation in the US telecommunications industry to study the 
multimarket contact effects: they investigate the impact of the movement from monopoly to 
duopoly situation (e.g., movement to multimarket contact situation) on the market conduct. 
                                                 
6  Recently there has been some emerging theoretical literature stating that multimarket contact may not 
always facilitate collusion (e.g., Thomas and Willig, 2006). This may be attributed to the imperfect 
monitoring of adherence to cooperation, which is observed in the situation of asymmetric information 
about rivals' actions. 
7  These papers also involve the construction of the multimarket contact measures. 
8  Although the authors argue that they study the mutual forbearance hypothesis in such a way, it seems as if 
their methodology is more applicable to study the firms' strategic interdependence like Bulow et al. 
(1985), or to study generally the firms' oligopolistic interactions. Bresnahan (1989) also advises not using 
the "mutual forbearance language" in case of the "conjectures" estimation. 
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3. Multi-market and multi-firm (multi-brand) linkages in the US 
automobile market 
3.1. Market definition 
Market definition is very important in the multimarket contact effects studies: markets should 
be strictly defined. In general, market boundaries could be outlined on the basis of several 
approaches. For example, the market boundaries could be delineated by the low cross-price 
elasticity of demand (on the basis of the econometric estimation of price elasticities). Another 
important empirical method of the market boundaries delineation is price correlation analysis. 
Other less frequently used methods are consumer interviews, shock analysis, Granger 
causality and cointegration tests, etc. (Bishop and Baldauf, 2006). 
The cross-price elasticities of demand for cars in a given market segment with respect to the 
cars in a different market segment are found to be low in the empirical studies. Given that and 
the industry wisdom about automotive market segmentation the definition of market segments 
seems to be suitable for the definition of markets, across which the multimarket contact 
effects could be investigated for the automobile industry. Brenkers and Verboven (2006b) 
study the market definition in the European car market and find that the segments are the 
relevant markets for all car classes (subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard/luxury, and 
sports), except for minivans, for which the relevant market definition should be the aggregate 
country level, i.e., all new cars. They recommend that competition authorities investigate the 
impact of their policies for each car market segment separately. Sudhir (2001) finds a 
different competition pattern across market segments in the US car market as mentioned 
above. Consumers within each car market segment are expected to be internally homogenous 
and externally heterogeneous. They may be similar within a market segment on the basis of 
age, income, lifestyle, brand loyalty, readiness to buy, etc. To sum up, industry analysts and 
academic researchers support the view that the car market segments constitute distinct sub-
markets, which differ in consumer demand, technology and competitors’ type (Requena-
Silvente and Walker, 2005). 
With respect to demand linkages in the automobile markets, it is necessary to find out, to 
what extent the cars from different market segments are substitutes. As it has been mentioned 
above, the cross-price elasticities with respect to the cars from the other market segments are 
usually found to be low. Car customers are younger, with lower incomes, and, thus, more 
price-sensitive in the smaller car market segments and older, with higher incomes, and less 
price-sensitive in the premium car market segments. Thus, it is unlikely that consumers from 
a luxury car market segment will switch to a small car/mini car segment when there is a price 
increase in the luxury car segment, and vice versa. The product substitution between the 
adjacent markets (e.g., compact and subcompact cars) is more plausible. In addition, the 
diversity in the price dispersion for different market segments could offer some support for 
the existence of distinct markets. On the supply side, there are likely to be economies of scale 
and scope across market segments for the automotive manufacturers, which rely a lot on the 
minimum efficiency scale to be profitable. 
3.2. Multimarket presence in the US automobile market 
The automobile market offers a nice possibility to study the multimarket contact effects on 
mutual forbearance across product lines and across geographical dimensions (i.e., the so-
called geographic-product markets). The industry consolidation has resulted in a few major 
independent producers (see Table 1), which operate across a number of geographical markets 
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(US, Western Europe, Japan, etc.).9 On the other hand, the development of the light trucks 
market has increased a number of product markets, across which the producers interact. 
Table 1: Interdependence of automotive manufacturers 
Manufacturer group Companies and share Further ownerships 
GM Group Opel/Vauxhall (100%)  
Saab (100%)  
Isuzu (12%)  
Suzuki (20%)  
Fuji Heavy (20%)  
Daewoo (42%)  
Fiat (10%) 
 
 
 
Maruti (54%) 
Ford Group Aston Martin (100%)  
Jaguar (100%) 
Mazda (33%)  
Volvo (100%)  
Land Rover (100%) 
 
DaimlerChrysler Group Mercedes-Benz (100%)  
Chrysler (100%)  
Smart (100%)  
Maybach (100%)  
Mitsubishi (24.7%) 
 
Fiat Group Fiat Auto (90%)  
 
Ferrari (90%)  
Alfa (100%)  
Lancia (100%)  
Maserati (100%) 
Renault/Nissan Group Dacia (100%)  
Nissan (44%)  
Samsung (70.1%) 
 
VW Group Audi (100%)  
Seat (100%)  
Skoda (100%)  
Bugatti (100%)  
Bentley (100%) 
Lamborghini (100%) 
Toyota Daihatsu (52%)  
BMW Rolls Royce (100%)  
Mini (100%) 
 
PSA Peugeot (100%)  
Citroen (100%) 
 
Hyundai Kia (60%)  
Asia (100%) 
 
Honda    
Porsche   
Rover MG  
Triumph, etc.  
 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2004) 
                                                 
9  In recent years there have been continuous changes in the corporate ownership of automobile companies. 
One of the recent most important changes has been the disengagement of Daimler from Chrysler: the 
private equity company Cerberus Capital Management L.P. has concluded the deal of purchasing 80.1% 
of the Chrysler Group from DaimlerChrysler in August 2007 for USD 7.4 bn. However, the picture of the 
ownership in Table 1 is relevant for the period of my estimations, i.e., 2001-2003, and I conduct my 
analysis on the basis of the ownership observed at that time. 
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The development of the light vehicles market is, in particular, a peculiar feature of the US 
automotive industry. At present, the light trucks sales make up about half of the total vehicles 
market sales in the US, increasing from about 32% in 1990. The most important market 
segments in the US are midrange (24.7% in 2003), pickup (18.1%) and sports-utility vehicles 
(SUVs) (26.7%). The mid-size segment share decreased from 28.3% in 1999 to 24.7% in 
2003 of the total market sales, which may to a certain degree be attributed to the increased 
competition from the SUVs. During 2000-2003 there has been an especially vivid trend in the 
growth of the SUVs market share, and this was the only growing market during 2000-2003, 
with the total light trucks showing positive growth rates. The other market segments 
developments have been rather volatile. The shares of the mid-range, traditional, pickup, and 
van segments declined, and the shares of the small, upscale, and sporty market segments 
remained stable during 1999-2003.10 
The picture of the multimarket contact presence in the automobile market can be, to a 
certain degree, inferred from Table 2. As it can be seen, the car manufacturer groups are 
present in almost all market segments. The product lines of many automotive manufacturers 
have become rather similar and their product markets, therefore, overlap. The US traditional 
car market segment is especially concentrated and is characterized by the high presence of the 
domestic automotive with only Toyota as an international player having a 13.2% market share 
in 2003. C-4 concentration ratio for individual market segments ranges from 65.4% in the 
sporty market segment, where the largest number of producers is present, to 100% in the 
traditional market segment, with only four producers being present. 
Table 2: US light vehicles market: shares of firms in market segments, %, 2003  
Group Small Mid- 
range 
Tradition Up- 
scale 
Sporty Pick- 
up 
Van SUV
Honda  17.2  6.6 6.4  11.0 8.4 
GM 26.9 32.5 36.3 18.4 6.1 35.2 24.3 32.0
Daimler/Chrysler 7.2 9.2 7.4 16.1 9.6 18.6 28.4 14.3
Hyundai/Kia 16.8 3.3   4.2  3.6 3.3 
VW  8.0  2.7 1.7  0.3 0.4 
Ford 19.4 10.8 43.0 21.3 36.7 35.5 23.2 22.2
Toyota 21.2 9.9 13.2 11.0 5.5 8.5 7.5 11.6
Renault/Nissan 5.6 7.3  6.8 7.3 2.2 1.7 4.5 
Mitsubishi 2.9 1.8   7.7   2.1 
BMW    17.0 11.3   0.9 
Fiat    0.1 0.3    
Porsche     3.1   0.3 
No. firms 7 9 4 9 12 5 8 11 
C-1 26.9 32.5 43.0 21.3 36.7 35.5 28.4 32.0
C-4 84.3 70.5 100 72.8 65.4 97.8 86.8 80.1
Domination of a 
market segment  
(C-1 ratio) 
GM GM Ford Ford Ford GM, 
Ford 
Chrysler, 
GM 
GM 
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations 
                                                 
10  Some studies have considered the impact of multimarket contact on current market growth rates (e.g., 
Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). The authors argue that the firms' interdependence is strengthened by 
the growth in the current markets if the firms are present in multiple markets, so that the negative 
relationship between multimarket contact and the current markets growth rates will be then observed. 
Evans and Kessides (1994) argue that if the demand growth rates differ across markets, the firms may 
shift their punishment power from the rapidly to the slowly growing industries. 
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The firms occupy different market shares or have different strengths in different market 
segments (based on “market share dominance”), which may be found due to the difference in 
the production costs between the firms, or due to the presence of the economies of scale, 
“home” brand loyalty, first-mover advantage, etc. The American Big Three dominate 
different product markets. GM dominates (occupies the highest share of the market segment) 
the small, midrange, pickup and SUVs market segments. Ford has the largest market shares in 
the traditional, upscale, sporty and pickup market segments, while Chrysler dominates the van 
market segment. Toyota, though, not dominating any market segment, has the highest market 
share in the small car market segment. Honda, Hyundai/Kia, VW, Renault/Nissan, Mitsubishi 
and BMW have a large market share in the mid-range market segment, in the small car market 
segment, in the midrange car market segment, in the midrange and sporty market segments, in 
the sporty market segment, and in the upscale market segment, respectively. Thus, it can be 
argued that producers occupy rather different positions of strength in different markets, 
notwithstanding the obvious dominance of the automobile market by the American Big Three. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the “most important” and “less important” markets for the 
automobile manufacturers as defined by the shares of the firm’s market segment sales in the 
firm’s total sales. The “importance” of the market or “market share dependence” can be also 
measured by the percentage of the firm’s total revenue (or sales) generated from the market. 
As for the American Big Three, Ford has the highest firm’s shares in the pickup and SUVs 
market segments and has been known for its competitive advantage in the SUV market. For 
GM, the SUVs and midrange market segments are the most important market segments in 
terms of the sales. Chrysler has high market shares in the pickup and SUVs market segments 
and is known to have a competitive advantage in the van segment, where it has the highest 
share among all the firms. For all American Big Three the SUVs are a very important market 
segment. For the other car producers, like for example Honda the midrange market segment is 
the most important market, while BMW gets most of its profits from selling cars in the 
upscale market. The SUVs market is important for both firms. 
Table 3: US light vehicles market: shares of markets segment sales in a firm’s total sales, %, 
2003  
 Small Mid- 
range 
Tradi
tion 
Up- 
scale 
Sporty Pick- 
up 
Van SUV Share 
in total 
US 
sales 
Honda  53.1  5.2 2.4  11.4 27.9 8.1 
GM 9.4 28.2 2.9 4.0 0.6 22.1 7.1 29.6 30.0 
Daimler/Chrysler 5.1 16.4 1.2 7.2 2.1 23.9 16.9 27.2 14.1 
Hyundai 44.2 21.4   3.3  7.9 23.2 3.8 
VW  85.2  7.2 2.1  1.2 4.2 2.3 
Ford 8.7 12.0 4.4 6.0 5.0 28.6 8.7 26.5 22.4 
Toyota 19.3 22.4 2.8 6.3 1.5 13.9 5.7 28.0 11.1 
Renault/Nissan 11.9 38.0  9.1 4.6 8.5 2.9 25.0 4.8 
Mitsubishi 18.8 28.9   15.1   37.1 1.5 
BMW    64.8 20.5   14.7 1.7 
Fiat    41.6 58.4     
Porsche     54.5   45.5 0.2 
Share of segment 
sales in total US 
sales 
10.1 25.0 2.3 6.3 3.0 18.1 8.4 26.8  
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations 
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To sum up, the US light vehicles market is a very concentrated market, with car 
manufacturers being present in almost all market segments. The market segments are, 
however, characterized by different competition intensity and are dominated by different car 
producers. These and other above described factors should be taken into account while 
performing a multimarket contact effects test. 
3.3. Multi-firm (multi-brand) linkages in the US automobile market 
Automobile producers do not only meet in multiple markets (both product and geographical). 
The global automobile market is characterized by the presence of a number of global 
automotive manufacturer groups owning several brands that dominate the market (see Table 1 
above), several horizontal partial ownership arrangements (in particular, a number of 
European and American automobile companies have become share-holders in several 
Japanese automobile manufacturers) and different interfirm relationships.11 This builds up a 
very complex picture of interrelationships and ownership structure in the global automotive 
industry, which certainly influences the firm behaviour. During the last few decades there has 
been an increasing number of mergers-acquisitions and alliances between the three 
automotive poles (Europe, US and Japan), as it has been reflected in the declining number of 
independent automotive manufacturers. The picture of firms’ ownership and interactions is a 
very dynamic one, as it is reflected by the constant changes in the firm ownership and 
corporate structure. Some most recent examples are DaimlerChrysler de-merger of 2007, 
although Daimler has retained about 20% share in Chrysler, or Ford’s sale of financially 
troubled Jaguar and Land Rover brands to Indian automobile producer Tata in 2008. 
Collusive behaviour may be facilitated and the independence of firm strategies across 
markets may be reduced the more firms behave on a corporate basis as opposed to a market-
by-market basis.12 Corporate groups (no brands) may develop products to compete with rival 
firms, or they may suffer from “cannibalization”. 
Table 4 gives an example of a product policy for VW Group, which includes brands VW, 
Skoda, Bentley, Bugatti, Audi, Seat, and Lamborghini. This illustrates the complex picture of 
multiple market presence and ownership structure in the automotive industry. In particular, 
the VW Group comprises brands with different brand image, both premium and volume 
brands. The question arises of whether the brands within a manufacturer group compete with 
each other (especially those only premium or volume brands), i.e., whether they suffer from 
“cannibalization”, or the profits are jointly maximized for the whole manufacturer group. 
 
                                                 
11  Under interfirm relationships I mean both equity and contractual arrangements among the automotive 
manufacturers themselves and between the OEMs and their suppliers (e.g., strategic alliances, joint 
ventures). 
12  A number of empirical studies, which do not take into account the effects of partial ownership 
arrangements (POAs), find some evidence that the degree of collusion is very similar in both Japanese, 
where POAs are common, and American car markets (e.g., Odagiri and Yamawaki, 1986, Yamawaki, 
1989). Some automobile market studies look at the impact of the POAs on market competition. In 
particular, Alley (1997) finds on the basis of a conjectural variation model, which takes into account 
POAs and foreign trade that the degree of collusion due to the POAs in the American car market is even 
higher than in the Japanese car market. The author studies the effect of cross-shareholdings between 
Japanese and US automobile manufacturers and between Japanese automobile manufacturers during 
1979-1994. It has been generally found that cross-ownership leads to a more collusive outcome (e.g., 
Reynolds and Snapp, 1986, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). 
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Table 4: Product policy of an independent automotive producer: an example of Volkswagen  
 Hatch Notch Station MPV Pickup/ 
deliverable 
van 
SUV Sports coupe Limousine 
coupe 
Convertible Roadster 
Luxury  Bentley     Lamborghini 
Bugatti 
  Lamborghini 
Upper  VW  
Audi 
    Bentley 
Lamborghini 
Bentley   
Upper 
middle 
 Audi Audi VW  VW     
Middle  VW  
Skoda  
Audi 
VW  
Audi 
VW  
Seat 
  Audi  Audi Audi 
Compact Audi  
VW  
Seat 
Skoda  
Seat 
VW  
Audi 
Skoda 
VW  
Seat 
Audi 
VW    VW  
Small VW  
Skoda 
Seat 
VW  
Seat 
Skoda 
Skoda        
Mini VW          
 Seat          
Source: Volkswagen AG 
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As related to the presence of global automotive groups in the US automobile market and 
interbrand competition within those groups, Mercedes and Chrysler13 do not compete with 
each other (relatively weak competition between premium and volume brands is usually 
expected). Saab’s presence in the US automobile market is not that significant, so one can’t 
seriously talk about competition between GM and Saab models.14 For the same goes for Ford 
and Volvo where Volvo is treated as a premium brand in the US automobile market.15 
The cases of cross-ownership arrangements, all of them between volume brands, as it can 
be inferred from Table 1 above are Ford (Mazda), GM (Subaru, Suzuki, Isuzu), 
RenaultNissan, Toyota (Daihatsu), Chrysler (Mitsubishi), GM (Fiat), Hyundai (Kia). Ford and 
Mazda compete directly in several market segments (small, midrange, sporty, pickup, van and 
SUVs). As for GM Group, Subaru is present in the midrange market segment, Suzuki is 
present in the small and SUVs market segments, and Isuzu is present in the SUVs market 
segment. Chrysler and Mitsubishi’s markets overlap in the small, midrange, sporty and SUVs 
market segments. Hyundai and Kia overlap in the small, midrange, and SUVs market 
segments. 
In this paper the multimarket contact effects are investigated at the level of manufacturer 
groups taking into account cross-ownership arrangements in the other firms as well.16 In 
addition, I distinguish between multiproduct (brand) and multiproduct (manufacturer group) 
assumptions while testing equilibrium interactions. 
4. Empirical structural framework for the US automobile market 
4.1. Demand 
4.1.1. Utility (McFadden’s (1978) utility specification) 
Assume that consumer i , 1,...,i n=  has utility ( , , ; )ij j j ju u x pξ θ=  from consuming product 
j , 1,...,j J= , where 0j =  is an outside good, jx  and jξ  are observed (e.g., horsepower, 
engine size) and unobserved (e.g., style, image) product characteristics, jp  is the price of 
product j , and ( , )θ α β=  are the parameters to be estimated. 
The linear version of the random indirect utility is given by: 
, 1,..., , 0,...,ij j iju i n j Jδ ε= + = =                                                                                              (1) 
where ijε  is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across consumers and 
products. 
The mean valuation for product j  common to all consumers is: 
                                                 
13  Mercedes and Chrysler belong to DaimlerChrysler Group: they are present together in the upscale and 
sporty market segments. 
14  Saab belongs to the GM Group: it has insignificant shares in the midrange and upscale car market 
segments. 
15  Volvo belongs to Ford Group: it has insignificant market shares in the midrange and SUVs market 
segments, and 4.5% market share in the upscale car market segment. Land Rover and Aston Martin also 
belong to Ford Premier Automotive Group and have very low shares in the SUVs and sporty market 
segments, respectively. 
16  Parker and Roller (1997) is the only paper that investigates the impact of cross-ownership and 
multimarket contact on the firm behaviour in the mobile phone industry. The more detailed investigation 
of the interfirm relationships in the automobile industry could be an interesting subject for future 
research. 
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j j j jx pδ β α ξ≡ − +                                                                                                                   (2) 
It is assumed that a consumer purchases one unit of good that brings him the highest utility. 
Therefore, consumer i  purchases one unit of product j  if and only if 
,0 ,ij iku u k J k j> ≤ ≤ ≠                                                                                                            (3) 
Consequently, the probability ijs  that the consumer i  purchases the product j  is: 
{ }
{ }
0
Pr ,
Pr ,
( ,..., ,..., )
ij j ij k ik
ik ij j k
j ij j ij ij j J
s j k
j k
F
δ ε δ ε
ε ε δ δ
ε δ δ ε ε δ δ∞−∞
= + > + ≠ =
= < + − ≠ =
= + − + −∫
                                                                               (4) 
where jF  are the partial derivatives of the joint cumulative distribution function F  of 
0( ,..., )i iJε ε  with respect to its j th argument. 
In this paper I present the empirical framework and tests for the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis on the basis of the one-level nested multinominal logit.17 
4.1.2. Nested multinominal logit: one nest 
Utility iju  of household i  for product j  in group g  is given by:
18 
(1 ) , 1,...,ij j j j ig ij gu x p j Iβ α ξ ζ δ ε= − + + + − =  
where (1 )ig ijζ δ ε+ −  is an extreme value random variable. 
The I  brands (products) are partitioned into G  groups: 0,1,...,g G= , the outside group is 
group 0 .19 Let the set (number) of products in a group g  be 0: ,...,g GI I I . 
The market share of product j  in the group g  is given by: 
/(1 )
/ ( , ) ( )
j
j g
g
es
D
δ σ
δ σ
−
=                                                                                                                (5) 
where /(1 ) ,0 1j
g
g
j I
D eδ σ σ−
∈
= ≤ <∑ . 
The probability of choosing group g  among all groups is given by: 
1
1
( , ) gg
g
g
D
s
D
σ
σ
δ σ
−
−
= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
                                                                                                              (6) 
This gives a market share for product j  that belongs to group g : 
                                                 
17  It should be noted that simple logit and nested logit models have been used extensively by economists for 
merger evaluation (e.g., Werden and Froeb, 1994, 2002, Jayaratne and Shapiro, 2000, Ivaldi and 
Verboven, 2005). 
18  In the exposition below I follow Berry (1994). 
19  Outside good" does not compete with other goods in the industry, its price or quantity is set exogenously. 
If there were not for the outside good, everyone would have been forced to purchase an "inside" good. 
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1/(1 ) /(1 )
/ 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
j j
g
j j g g
g g g g
g g
De es s s
D D D D
σδ σ δ σ
σ σ σδ σ δ σ δ σ
−− −
− −= = =∑ ∑                                                (7) 
where [ ]0,1σ ∈  is a measure of the degree of substitution, or the within-group correlation of 
the utility levels. The lower σ  means the lower correlation of preferences. 0σ =  implies no 
correlation of preferences, and consumers may thus switch to the products in another group, 
which means the standard logit model. 1σ =  implies perfect correlation of preferences for 
products within the same group, i.e., perfect substitutes. E.g., when a new compact car is 
introduced, the demand for the other subcompact cars will go down rather than the demand 
for the cars in the other segments (Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005). 
The group 0 has only one outside good, with 0 0δ ≡  (i.e., the utility from consuming the 
outside good is normalized to zero) and 0 1D =  and with the market share of: 
0
1
1( , )
g
g
s
D σ
δ σ
−
= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
                                                                                                                (8) 
The inversion procedure for the mean utility level has been suggested by Berry (1994). 
Consequently, the following demand equation may be derived by inverting the market share 
equation: 
0 /ln( ) ln( ) ln( )j j j j g js s x p sβ α σ ξ= + − + +                                                                              (9) 
where /j gs  is the share of product j  in group g  (within-group share), js  is the share of 
product j  in the total market, and 0s  is the proportion of the consumers who choose the 
outside good. 
The own price elasticity /j js pE of the market share js  of product j  is: 
/j j
j j
s p
j j
s p
E
p s
∂= ∂                                                                                                                        (10) 
with 
j j j
j j j
s s
p p
δ
δ
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂                                                                                                                        (11) 
/
1 1 (1 )
1
j
j j g j
j
s
s s sσ σδ σ
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦∂ −                                                                                       (12) 
Thus, the own-price elasticity can be written down as: 
/ /
1 1 (1 )
1j js p j j g j
E p s sα σ σσ ⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦−                                                                               (13) 
The cross-price elasticity /j ms pE  of the market share of product j  with respect to the price 
of product m  mp  is given by: 
/j m
j m
s p
m j
s pE
p s
∂= ∂                                                                                                                      (14) 
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with 
j j m
m m m
s s
p p
δ
δ
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂                                                                                                                       (15) 
/( )1
j
j m g m
m
s
s s sσδ σ
∂ = − +∂ −                                                                                                      (16) 
Therefore, the cross-price elasticity is: 
/ /( )1j ms p m m g m
E ap s sσσ= +−                                                                                                    (17) 
if j  and m  belong to the same market segment, and 
/j ks p k k
E p sα=                                                                                                                          (18) 
if j  and k  belong to different market segments. 
4.2. Costs and firm behaviour 
4.2.1. Price competition 
The log-linear marginal cost function is assumed: 
ln( )j j jc w γ ω= +                                                                                                                     (19) 
where jw  and jω  are observed and unobserved product characteristics, respectively, and γ  
are the parameters to be estimated.20 
Assume F  sellers of a differentiated product.21 Firm f  produces fJ  of F  total 
differentiated products. The demand for product j  is given by ( ), ;jMs p X θ , where M  is the 
market size. Let 
fJ
P  be the set of prices that the player f  sets. Product characteristics for any 
year are assumed to be exogenous. Assume that the outside good is competitively supplied. 
The firm f  chooses 
fJ
P  to maximize its profits, for given J  and jp  with fj J∈ : 
max ( ) ( )
fJ f f
f j j j jj Jp j J
p c Ms p Fπ ∈ ∈= Σ − − ∑                                                                                   (20) 
where jc  is the constant marginal cost of brand j , ( )js p  is the market share of brand j , 
being a function of all brands’ prices, and jF  is fixed cost for a product j . 
The first-order conditions for the manufacturer f ’s profit maximization problem are 
(assuming that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that prices are strictly 
positive):22 
                                                 
20  The quantity variable jQ  may be included to allow for increasing/decreasing returns to scale. 
21  In the exposition below I follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). 
22  Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) have shown that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in case of single-
product firms, using a rather general demand model. Anderson and de Palma (1992) have shown the 
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in case of multi-product firms using the nested logit 
demand model. 
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( )( ) ( ) 0
f
r
j r r
r J j
s ps p p c
p∈
∂+ − =∂∑                                                                                               (21) 
Let firm f  have ( )k f  products, which are indexed by 1 ( ),...,f fk fj J J= , with 11 1J =  
and ( )
F
k FJ J= . 
Define matrix fΔ  as: 
( )1
1 1
( )1
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
ff
k f
f f
f
ff
k f
f f
k f k f
s Js J
p J p J
s Js J
p J p J
⎛ ⎞∂∂⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
…
# % #
"
                                                                                         (22) 
In vector notation, the first-order conditions for J  total products simultaneously can be 
written down as: 
1
1 1 10
... 0
0 FJ j j
s p c
s p c
s p c
−Ω
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ −⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
                                                                                        (23) 
Assume that Ω  is a non-singular matrix. Therefore, the first-order conditions can be 
expressed as: 
1p c s−= +Ω                                                                                                                            (24) 
with the marginal cost equation taking up the following form: 
1ln( )p s wγ ω−−Ω = +                                                                                                             (25) 
Within the last equation, the following scenarios can be tested: Bertrand behaviour with 
single-product firms, Bertrand behaviour with multi-product firms23, perfectly collusive (total 
industry) behaviour, market-segment collusive behaviour, and assumption concerning 
multimarket contact firm behaviour. This can be done within the menu, or conjectural 
variations parameters approaches that are discussed below. 
The analysis of different price equilibrium assumptions can be done at the market segment 
level (i.e., case of myopic firms, each firm considers in its profit maximization task only the 
products of a particular market segment). In this case, the market segments are treated to be 
independent. The analysis can be also done at the firm level (i.e., case of firms that behave 
strategically, the firm takes into account the cross-price elasticities of all its products), where 
the market segments are not independent and the substitution between them is possible. Both 
scenarios are tested in this paper to choose the pattern of the firm behaviour that best fits the 
data. 
                                                 
23  If only products of a firm in the same market segment are considered by the firm in the profit 
maximization task, the explicit expression for the mark-up can be derived. If other products of the firm in 
the different market segments are considered as well, the whole matrix of market share derivatives with 
respect to the price has to be inverted to get the markups. The derivatives of products with respect to 
products in the other market segments are usually found to be low anyway, so that the markups may be 
not influenced significantly (Verboven, 1996). Verboven (1996) also tests for the presence of market 
segment-specific collusion. Sudhir (2001) finds a different competition pattern across market segments. 
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4.2.2. Menu approach 
The menu approach is discussed in Bresnahan (1987), Gasmi et al. (1990, 1992) and 
advocated, in particular, by Nevo (1998). Under this approach, different models of 
competition may be tested through setting different elements of the ownership matrix to one. 
The choice among the different models of conduct, which constitute a finite set (defined by a 
researcher based on his understanding), is done on the basis of “fit” of different models, 
formally by performing a test of nonnested hypothesis (e.g., Vuong, 1989).  
Consequently, the matrix 1−Ω  may be written down as 1θ −Δ , where 1−Δ  is the matrix of 
own- and cross-price elasticities, and θ  is an ownership matrix, with 1ijθ =  if i  and j  are 
produced by the same firm, and 0  otherwise. This is an element-by-element multiplication of 
matrices of the same dimension. 
4.2.3. Conjectural variations approach 
The conjectural variations approach has been criticized for the problem of the interpretation of 
the conjectural variations parameters and the problem of identification, especially in case of 
differentiated products.24 The detailed discussion of this approach can be found in Bresnahan 
(1989) and Nevo (1998). The conjectural variations approach may allow testing for the degree 
of collusiveness, or competitiveness of a particular market segment/industry, or distinguishing 
between the more collusive and more competitive markets, not necessarily finding perfect 
market segment collusion as based on the menu approach.  
5. Methodological framework for testing the multimarket contact 
effects 
5.1. Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis: idea 
The “ideal” test for identifying the multimarket contact effects on collusive behaviour would 
be to contrast the pricing behaviour in a single-market (e.g., two firms meet each other in one 
market M1) and a multi-market context (e.g., these two firms move together to another market 
M1+M2) to test for incremental effects on the firm behaviour. In addition, one could take into 
account a certain period of time and compare the break-down of collusive prices in M1 world 
and M1+M2 world, and if this period of break-downs under the latter scenario is shorter, then 
this could be a hard test for showing that the multimarket contact presence leads to more 
collusion. 
The automobile industry, although characterized by extensive multimarket contact 
presence, offers no such “optimal” situations to test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis, 
and, thus, necessitates the search for other approaches to study the behaviour of the 
multimarket contact firms. I test for multimarket contact firm coalitions and perform 
simulations as a way to investigate the multimarket contact effects on the firm behaviour. The 
idea behind these approaches, which have not been applied before in the multimarket contact 
studies, is discussed in the next two sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
5.2. Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (1): testing collusive 
assumption among the multimarket contact firms 
As mentioned above, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) state that the multimarket contact may 
lessen the degree of competition between the rivals as the multiple competitors are more 
                                                 
24  Conjectural variations for the market segments in the automobile industry have been estimated by Sudhir 
(2001) and constructed for the market segments at the country level by Brenkers and Verboven (2006a). 
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likely to recognize their mutual dependence and to sustain collusion across the range of 
markets in which they meet. The advantage of fierce competition in one market is weighted 
against the costs of potential retaliations by the competitors in the other markets where they 
meet each other. 
The idea behind the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (1) is to test different 
assumptions/hypotheses concerning the firm behaviour by adjusting the ownership matrix θ  
in an appropriate way (see Section 4.2.2) in order to derive the competition pattern in the 
industry and across market segments, including the possibility of the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis. The test under this approach can be conducted in two steps: 
Step 1. Derive the pricing equation under the multimarket contact assumption using the 
menu approach, i.e., by specifying a particular ownership matrix. 
Taking into account the above theoretical insights about the mutual forbearance hypothesis, 
the formal test for testing the multimarket effects on prices would be to see whether the 
multimarket contact firm takes into account the cross-price reactions of the other multimarket 
contact firms across the markets in its profit-maximization task: 
, ,
max ( ) ( )
J f MMCMMC MMC
f j j jp j J f MMC
p c Ms pπ
∈ ∈ ∈
= −∑                                                                             (26) 
where MMCJ  are all products of multimarket contact firms, including the multimarket contact 
firm f . That is, the joint profit maximization of the products of the multimarket contact firms 
coalition is assumed (a firm f  belongs to the set of the multimarket contact firms MMC ). 
The first-order conditions for a multimarket contact firm f  that internalizes the cross-price 
effects with its competitors can be written down as follows: 
,
( )( ) ( ) 0
MMC
r
j r r
r J f MMC j
s ps p p c
p∈ ∈
∂+ − =∂∑                                                                                   (27) 
This expression can be specified as market segment-specific (market segments are 
independent), or industry-specific (market segments are interrelated). 
In addition to the multimarket contact specification, the Bertrand-Nash multi-product price 
specification can be derived not only for the car manufacturers (brand level, e.g., a Mercedes 
car) but also for the car manufacturer groups (i.e., corporate group, e.g., Mercedes and 
Chrysler cars of DaimlerChrysler Group) and those car manufacturers that hold shares in the 
other automotive firms (i.e., cross-ownership arrangements). 
Step 2. Test different assumptions about the equilibrium interactions of firms (i.e., single-
product, multi-product, collusion, collusion due to the multimarket contact), and choose the 
best supply model among the competing supply-side models on the basis of the goodness-of-
fit of the model (most often R-squared, adjusted R-squared, some information, or prediction 
criterion), or the test of nonnested hypotheses (e.g., Vuong, 1989). In the absence of publicly 
available information on marginal costs and price-cost margins, this has been a way that has 
been pursued in a number of empirical studies as well.25 
The goodness-of-fit of the model as measured by the R-squared may be not the best 
criterion for selecting the best model, especially when the model specifications appear 
similarly good (in terms of the estimated coefficients and standard errors). The estimated 
                                                 
25  There are only a few studies that select the best supply-side specification on the basis of some calculated 
marginal costs, or some publicly available information on the price-cost margins. For example, Nevo 
(2001) compares the estimated and observed markups to select the best model specification for the supply 
side. 
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coefficients in different models could be also investigated and assessed to find out which ones 
are the most plausible ones (e.g., Verboven, 2002, Bonnet et al., 2006). 
As mentioned before, models are often selected on the basis of some information criterion 
(e.g., Akaike (1973, 1974) information criterion (AIC)26, Schwarz (1978) Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC)27, Hannan and Quinn (1979)). Under this approach, the model 
with the smallest information criterion is preferred. However, the selection procedures that 
these tests are based upon are not completely satisfactory (Rivers and Vuong, 1999). The 
actual values of the model selection criteria can be subject to statistical variations as they are 
determined by sample information. The models may not, thus, outperform each other 
significantly. In case of linear regression models, the criteria that are based on the calculation 
of the in-sample mean square error of prediction (MSEP) are widespread. 
As there appears to be no single most reliable way to choose the best supply-side model, the 
results from the tests for non-nested hypotheses (MacKinnon, White, and Davidson, 1983, 
and Rivers and Vuong, 2002), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) and the sum of squared residuals (SSR) are compared in this 
paper to reach some meaningful and hopefully reliable results at the end. The application of 
MacKinnon, White, and Davidson (1983), and Rivers and Vuong (2002) test procedures is 
described in detail in Appendix. The intuition behind these tests is given in the Introduction of 
the paper. These methods are the most frequently applied in the literature to choose a model 
specification that best fits the data. In addition, the concrete tests are chosen so that to fit my 
estimation methods for the supply side. 
5.3. Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (2): testing shock effects 
This test could be viewed as continuation of the previous test, or it can be conducted 
separately as well. The test procedure involves two steps. 
Step 1. Estimate the demand and marginal cost equations, and identify the competition 
behaviour in market segments through testing different assumptions about the firm behaviour 
(e.g., one market is collusive, the others are not, or all are collusive, etc.), and choose, as 
above, the best supply-side model, which best fits the data, on the basis of some goodness-of-
fit criteria, or test. 
Step 2. Simulate some shock28 in a particular market segment, e.g., a price war in the 
(more) collusive segment, and see whether and to what extent it impacts the firm behaviour in 
the other market segments. The price war is approximated by the changes in the ownership 
matrix for that market (from the collusive to the competitive assumption). The question is 
whether the price war in this particular market segment will have some impact on the firm 
behaviour in the other market segments. The main idea behind this is to look at the relative 
magnitude of the “own”-market reactions vs. cross-market reactions, and to see whether there 
is any correlation in the prices across the market segments. Another alternative is to move 
from the competitive to the collusive behaviour assumption in a particular market segment. 
Consequently, the new equilibrium price under the new ownership matrix ( newΩ ) is: 
                                                 
26  Akaike's information criterion (AIC), based on the minimization of the loss of information, is calculated 
on the basis of the mean squared prediction error (in case of the OLS estimation). 
27  Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is similar to the AIC criterion, it imposes only a heavier penalty for 
the degrees of freedom loss. 
28  The examples of possible real shocks could be a significant change in the market share of a firm, or some 
abrupt change in the multimarket contact measure over time, or a price war in a particular market 
segment. The relatively short period of time for which I have the data does not allow me to observe such 
changes in reality, that is why, I chose to simulate some hypothetical shocks. 
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* * 1 *( ) ( )newp c p s p
−= +Ω                                                                                                        (28) 
where *p  is a vector of the post-predicted equilibrium prices, c  are the estimated marginal 
costs from the step-by-step estimation. The system of the non-linear equations has to be 
solved for an equilibrium price.29 The simulation of shocks could probably help me to 
disentangle the effect of market concentration and multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. 
In addition, the simulation of shocks to separate markets allows studying the firms’ (strategic 
and collusive) interdependence across the markets. 
6. Data and estimation results 
6.1. Data 
The major source of the automotive data for this research is the Automotive News Market 
Data Book for 2001-2003.30 The available data for the US automotive market include: 
1. Car and light truck sales by market class for models. In the dataset those models with 
the yearly sales of less than 200 models have been excluded. 
2. Prices of cars, pickups, minivans, vans and SUVs. 
Prices for the given year are shown as of April/May of the corresponding year. The base 
prices include the retail price as suggested by the manufacturer and the destination charge. 
The prices of imported vehicles cover ocean freight and the U.S. import duty. State, or local 
taxes, or optional equipment are not included into the prices. The list prices are converted into 
real terms by using the US Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
3. Vehicles characteristics: auto transmission, air conditioning, antilock brakes, 
sunroof/moonroof; information on dimensions, engines, capacities, safety, 
miscellaneous. The physical characteristics of the base specification have been used 
in the estimations. 
4. Automotive advertising spending in the US (measured by the US ad spending per 
vehicle). 
The data on miles per gallon, engine volume, cylinders are available from the Fuel 
Economy Guide by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)). The log of the total 
sales volume, or global production by model, which is available from the Global Insight, can 
be used to account for the economies of scale. The  GDP data are taken from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA)). 
The number of potential customers is approximated by the total number of households in 
the economy, following Berry, Levinsonhn and Pakes (1995). Each household is treated to be 
a potential buyer of a new car. The information on the number of households is taken from the 
US Census Bureau. 
The automotive market classification by the Automotive News, which is used in this study, 
is determined by vehicle size, price and market intent.31 The cars are segmented into the 
                                                 
29  Nevo (1997) solves ( )( ) ( )post p p mc s pΩ ∗ ∗− = ∗  using Matlab standard algorithm for solving non-
linear equations (fsolve.m). 
30  I have tried to do some cross-sectional estimations, but it is difficult to fit the model. This result is similar 
to the one by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), who have chosen to use the panel data, and Nevo 
(2001), who has used the quarterly data for several geographical markets. 
31  For the sensitivity analysis (for my estimations, the definition of a relevant market is very important), 
alternative market segmentations could be tried, in particular, the one by Ward (Ward's Automotive 
Yearbook). According to this classification, which is based upon price, body style and size, the light 
vehicles are segmented into the following classes: small, middle, large, luxury, cross-utility vehicles, 
SUVs, vans and pickups. 
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following classes: small, midrange, traditional, upscale, sporty, alternative power32. The light 
trucks are segmented into the following classes: pickups, vans, and SUVs. SUVs, midrange, 
and pickups are the largest car market segments in the US. The SUVs market is characterized 
by the highest number of car models and may be viewed as the most competitive one. 
Japanese competitors play a large role in the smaller car market segments, while the European 
car producers are the major competitors of the US car producers in the upscale market 
segment. 
The summary statistics for selected variables across the market segments are presented in 
Table 5. The prices, size and horsepower increase as one moves from the smaller car 
segments to the larger ones, also to those with the higher presence of premium car brands. 
Table 5: US light vehicles market: descriptive statistics across market segments 
Variable Mean Std. dev.   
  Overall Between Within 
Small     
horsepower 122 14.9 14.1 5.3 
price 12968 1608.5 1620.4 231.8 
size 11795 622.7 595.4 166.0 
Midrange     
horsepower 159 25.9 25.5 5.3 
price 18949 2703.0 2673.3 402.1 
size 13262 1038.6 1007.3 264.5 
Traditional     
horsepower 215 15.4 18.1 1.1 
price 25064 1810.0 2050.2 351.1 
size 15366.7 980.2 1006.9 27.3 
Upscale     
horsepower 227 38.1 37.8 6.1 
price 38009 10951.9 11009.7 845.8 
size 13917 1186.3 1165.6 251.7 
Sporty     
horsepower 199 61.7 61.8 3.9 
price 29822.1 15889.1 15591.9 390.0 
size 11956 1245 1235.7 169.4 
Pickup     
horsepower 164 35.8 35.0 11.6 
price 15570 2368.2 2369.1 588.6 
size 14527 1648.4 1686.2 227.2 
Van     
horsepower 188 19.3 17.5 8.2 
price 22668 2109.9 2015.7 544.3 
size 15135 1180.0 1153.8 153.4 
SUV     
horsepower 202 54.0 52.7 10.3 
price 25386.9 7012.2 6910.2 1020.8 
size 13543 1794.7 1808.4 24.9 
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations 
                                                 
32  The alternative power market is not analyzed because it is a thin market. 
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In my estimations I do not include all the available technical characteristics in order to 
minimize the problem of multicollinearity. The variables have been chosen into the 
specification on the basis of the p-value correlation analysis. The summary of the variables 
used in the estimations is given in Table 6. The following variables have been selected into 
the specifications: horsepower (to measure car performance), width and length (vehicle 
dimensions), air conditioning and antilock brakes (safety), automatic transmission 
(convenience), miles per gallon (MPG) (fuel efficiency). 
Table 6: US light vehicles market: variables description 
Variable Variable name Notes 
Horsepower horse Net horsepower 
Width width Overall width (in.) 
Length length Overall length (in.) 
Air conditioning air-cond Dummy: 1 if air conditioning 
is standard equipment 
Antilock brakes brakes Dummy: 1 if antilock brakes 
is standard equipment 
Transmission transm Dummy: 1 if automatic 
transmission is standard 
equipment 
Miles-per-gallon mpgcity City miles per gallon: for 
urban driving 
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations 
6.2. Estimation strategies for the demand equation and full system 
In general, the demand and pricing equations can be estimated either separately, or jointly. 
Under the separate, or step-by-step, estimation, the demand equation is estimated first. After 
that the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities is constructed on the basis of the estimated 
demand parameters. In the next step the pricing equation is estimated after having substituted 
into it the matrix of the elasticities. The standard errors of the pricing equation parameters 
have to be corrected. 
There are several advantages of this two-step procedure. For example, the computational 
burden may be reduced due to the separate estimation of the demand and pricing equations. 
Different supply-side specifications may be estimated without re-estimating the demand 
function each time. The possible misspecification of the supply side will have no impact on 
the demand side results (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001).33 The major drawback of this 
procedure is the loss in the efficiency of the estimated parameters. 
6.3. Instruments 
Prices and market shares are endogenous, correlated with the error term jξ  and jω , and, 
consequently, have to be instrumented. Prices will be collinear with product characteristics 
that are not observed. The introduction of product fixed effects to control for unobserved 
characteristics can lead to an identification problem due to the correlation between fixed 
effects and product characteristics. If there is some positive correlation between prices and 
omitted characteristics, the price coefficient will tend towards zero. 
The detailed discussion of the choice of the efficient instruments for differentiated products 
models can be found in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). In general several groups of 
                                                 
33  Step-by-step estimations are also used by Nevo (2001). 
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instruments can be pointed out that have been used in the studies on the differentiated 
products demand and structural model estimation: cost shifters and quasi-cost shifters, 
product characteristics, prices in other markets (following Hausman et al. (1994) and 
Hausman (1996)), etc.34 I use the product characteristics as instruments in my estimations, 
which I will discuss in detail in the following. 
The best candidates for the instruments in the differentiated product markets are the model 
characteristics, which are usually treated as exogenous, based on the assumption that in the 
short run they cannot be quickly adjusted by a firm. Thus, the matrix Z  of instruments 
includes the product’s own characteristics (which decreases the number of necessary 
additional instruments) and other exogenous variables used in the estimations. Product 
characteristics are used as instruments for a set of unobserved supply shifters in the pricing, or 
marginal cost equation. Furthermore, the functions of the exogenous characteristics of the 
competing products can be used as instruments. 
The major difficulty with using nonprice characteristics as instruments is that these 
variables are usually used both in the demand and cost side. As a result, there may be an 
insufficient number of instruments for the parameters that have to be estimated. This problem 
has been discussed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), and the usage of 
the characteristics of competitors and their functions as additional instruments has been 
suggested. The functions of the exogenous physical characteristics (own and competitors’) 
can be used as instruments (sums and averages). The car’s own price and demand will be 
correlated with the physical characteristics of the other products, and depend on the degree 
and closeness of competition that the firms face with other competitors. The distance from the 
nearest neighbouring product will determine the markup of each brand. 
Bresnahan et al. (1997) suggest the following groups of instruments: principles of 
differentiation (defined on a group-specific basis), ownership (defined on a firm-specific 
basis, making use of the economics of the multiproduct pricing) and ownership with 
principles of differentiation (combination of a group-specific and a firm-specific basis). 
Therefore, the following instruments could be used for the estimation of the one-level 
nested logit: 1) number of other products in a group; 2) sum/average of characteristics of other 
products in a group (interacted with a group dummy variable); 3) number of other products 
the firm sells in the group; 4) sum/average of characteristics of other products the firm sells in 
the group (interacted with a group dummy variable); 5) number of products the other firms 
sell in the group; 6) sum/average of characteristics of products the other firms sell in the 
group (interacted with a group dummy variable). 
                                                 
34  Other authors use a lagged error term in the demand equation (Bonnet et al., 2005), brand dummies 
(Nevo, 2001), or lagged endogenous variables as instruments. 
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6.4. Estimation results 
6.4.1. Demand and supply 
The results of the demand estimation for the one-level nested logit35 can be found in Table 7. 
The demand equation can be estimated by the 2SLS, or GMM. The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity has been tested by performing the test of heterogeneity by Pagan and Hall 
(1983) for the instrumental variables estimation. The test results have not rejected the 
homoscedasticity hypothesis, thus, the IV estimation should be rather used (see the first two 
columns in Table 7). GMM estimation results are presented for sensitivity analysis and are 
quite similar in magnitude to the 2SLS estimation results (see the last two columns in Table 
7). 
Table 7: US light vehicles market: demand estimation 
Variables IV.A IV. B GMM.A GMM. B 
α  -0.00015*** -4.00*** -0.00017*** -4.47*** 
( )gσ  0.87** 0.70** 0.80*** 0.69** 
horsepower 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
width -0.06** -0.03 -0.05** -0.03* 
length -0.01 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
air conditioning 0.08 0.49*** 0.18* 0.55*** 
brakes 0.16 0.29** 0.21* 0.36*** 
transmission 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.38** 0.43*** 
mpgcity -0.04* -0.07*** -0.03* -0.08*** 
const 0.63 35.19*** -0.39 40.16*** 
Adj. R2 0.36 0.56 0.26 0.51 
Root MSE 1.06 0.88 1.14 0.93 
Pagan&Hall  
(all, p-value) 
1.00 0.99 - - 
Overidentification   4.95 3.14 
Source: own estimations 
Note: Specifications IV.A and GMM.A are with prices in levels, while Specifications IV.B and GMM.B are estimated with prices expressed 
in logarithms. ***, **, * - indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Time dummies have been included but 
are not reported. mpgcity stands for miles per gallon (city). Nest is market segment.  
Horsepower has been found statistically significant in all specifications and has a positive 
sign as expected. Width and length have got a negative sign. Length is, however, not 
significant anyway. Air conditioning, brakes and automatic transmission also have got an 
expected positive sign. The miles per gallon variable has a negative sign contrary to the a 
priori expectations: the higher miles per gallon value, the more efficient the vehicle is. The 
negative sign was also found in some other studies (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, 
Sudhir, 2001). The included but not reported in the table time fixed effects might capture 
macro-economic fluctuations that influence a person’s decision to buy a car. 
                                                 
35  The estimations with different correlation parameters for different market segments (not reported here) 
produced rather implausible magnitudes (higher correlation for more luxury segments), and some 
coefficients turned out to be greater than 1, although the Wald test has not rejected the hypothesis that 
they could be equal to or less than one. The latter problem could be explained by the choice of 
instruments. It should be also mentioned that in some cases the coefficients greater than 1 could be 
consistent with the utility-maximizing behaviour. 
 Besides I have done estimations for the nested logit with two nests (market segment and country of 
origin, i.e., domestic vs. foreign producer) and the estimates of the correlation parameters were not 
consistent with utility-maximizing behaviour. 
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For the calculation of own- and cross-price elasticities, the estimation of markups and the 
subsequent supply-side estimations, the estimates of price and segment correlation parameters 
are considered to be the most important. The price coefficient is negative as expected and is 
quite low in magnitude. The estimated segment correlation parameters can be interpreted in 
terms of the correlation of consumer preferences within a particular market segment. When 
the correlation parameters are statistically different from zero, this may mean that consumers 
may not be so willing to substitute away from that market segment when there is a price 
increase in that segment. The results show that consumer preferences are strongly correlated 
within a market segment. This may be interpreted as some evidence for strong competition 
within market segments in the US light vehicles market. 
I have also estimated the demand equation jointly with the hedonic pricing equation. These 
results can be found in Table 8 (first column, ‘joint estimation’). In this case width, length, 
and miles per gallon have got a statistically significant positive sign, however, the air 
conditioning has got a negative sign. One may argue that adding the supply side contributes to 
a better model identification. The segment correlation parameter is significantly lower than 
under the separate estimation of the demand equation. 
I also present some results of the random coefficients model estimation for the US light 
vehicles market (the last four columns, ‘random’).36 The first two columns give the parameter 
estimates and their standard errors for the means (β ’s), while the last two columns give the 
parameter estimates and their standard errors of standard deviations ( kσ ’s). However, the 
results of many coefficients have turned out to be negative.37 Thus, it could be better to rely 
on the estimates from the one-level nested logit to proceed with the test for the multimarket 
contact effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36  I have tried to estimate the demand equation, which is derived from the following utility specification 
following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999): 
 ij j j i j k jk ik ijku x p x vβ ξ α σ ε= + − + +∑  for 1,...,j J= , where i
iy
αα = , β  is a vector of mean 
parameters to be estimated, and kσ  is a vector of standard deviations parameters to be estimated. 
 The price coefficient is interacted with income. Income draws are made from the US Consumer 
Population Survey (CPS). I introduce consumer heterogeneity on the products characteristics: the random 
draws have been made from multinominal normal distribution ( ikv ). This together should have allowed 
me to get more flexible substitution patterns. 
37  One of the possible explanations could be the short time period of the data that I have. A longer time 
span, and, thus, a larger number of markets could contribute to the better model identification. 
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Table 8: US light vehicles market: demand estimation (continuation) 
Variables Joint 
estimation 
Random    
  Means (β ′s)  Std. 
deviations 
( ( )kσ ′s) 
 
  Estimate Std. err. Estimate Std. err. 
price-income -0.0001*** -4.30 0.00   
ln 
(segmentshare) 
0.43***     
horsepower 0.01*** 0.60 0.01 0.06 0.04 
width 0.11*** -1.14 0.03 0.13 0.26 
length 0.01*** 2.37 0.02 0.08 0.11 
air 
conditioning 
-0.23*** -0.18 0.00 0.12 0.05 
brakes 1.17*** -0.15 0.01 0.03 0.05 
transmission 0.97*** -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.10 
mpgcity 0.13*** -3.49 0.07 0.16 0.00 
year01  0.28 0.00   
year02  0.39 0.01   
const -17.38*** -9.83 0.12 0.24 0.05 
Source: own estimations 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Time dummies have been included but are not 
reported in case of joint estimation. 
The supply-side equation under different assumptions on the firms’ equilibrium interactions 
is estimated using OLS with robust standard errors (Huber/White sandwich estimator of the 
variance) (see Table 9).38 This table presents the results for some selected specifications: 
‘Single’: single-product Bertrand pricing equilibrium; ‘Multi’: multi-product (brand-level) 
Bertrand pricing equilibrium; ‘Market’: market-segment collusive assumption for each market 
segment; ‘Hedonic’: the pricing equation under a competitive assumption; MMC1: collusive 
assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan and competitive 
assumption for the others; MMC2: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, 
Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and BMW and competitive assumption for the others; MMC3: 
collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and competitive assumption 
for the others; MMC4: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and competitive 
assumption for the others. 
Horsepower is found to be positive in all specifications. The signs and magnitudes of some 
coefficients have been changing across different specifications.39 Initially Toyota doesn’t 
appear to be the most efficient producer. These results may be in line with some of the results 
of the previous studies. In particular, Petrin (2002) finds the marginal costs to be slightly 
higher for Japanese producers as compared to those of American producers. Higher marginal 
costs for Japanese producers have been also found by Sudhir (2001). 
                                                 
38  I present the estimation results under selected assumptions, as the results are rather similar under all 
specifications, just to illustrate the problem that I have faced while choosing the best supply-side 
specification: on the basis of the estimated coefficients and R-squared comparison the supply-side models 
do not appear to outperform each other significantly. 
39  Bonnet et al. (2005), for example, obtain different magnitudes and signs of coefficients in the cost 
equations. Therefore, they performed a non-nested test to differentiate between different patterns of 
competition. 
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Table 9: US light vehicles market: supply-side estimation results under selected assumptions 
Variables Single Multi Market Hedonic MMC1 MMC2 MMC3 MMC4 
horsepower 1.00*** 1.01*** 1.26*** 0.95*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.13*** 1.07*** 
width -0.05 -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.14 0.01 0.02 -0.13 
length -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.74*** -0.48*** -0.94*** -0.64*** -0.79*** -0.52*** 
air conditioning 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 
brakes 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05* 0.06*** 0.05** 0.04** 
transmission 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
mpgcity 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.19*** 0.12* 0.16** 0.10* 
year01 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.03** 0.03* 0.04** 0.03* 0.03* 
year02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
hyundai -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.60*** -0.34*** -0.22*** -0.50*** 0.21*** -0.23*** 
kia -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.60*** -0.33*** -0.16*** -0.52*** -0.17*** -0.20*** 
toyota -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.33*** -0.19*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.10*** 
gm -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.47*** -0.30*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.38*** -0.34*** 
ford -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.40*** -0.25*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.29*** 
chrysler -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.43*** -0.28*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.34*** 
nissan -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.57*** -0.38*** -0.52*** -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.28*** 
mazda -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.15*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.19*** 
mitsubishi -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.33*** -0.19*** -0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.09* 
suzuki -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.59*** -0.37*** -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.51*** -0.44*** 
honda -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.35*** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.31*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 
vw -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.21*** -0.11*** 0.02 0.09* 0.02 0.02 
subaru -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.40*** -0.25*** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
audi -0.05 -0.06 -0.12** -0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.02 0.05 
bmw 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.21** 0.13*** 
mercedes 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 
volvo 0.07* 0.06 0.03 0.07* 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.09** 
jaguar 0.08* 0.07 0.00 0.09** 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.11** 
saab 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 
const 7.58*** 7.49*** 6.58*** 7.61*** 7.42*** 6.47*** 7.57*** 7.30*** 
R-sqr. 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 
Root MSE 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 
Source: own estimations 
Note: ***, **, * - indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The estimates are presented based on GMM.A specification. Isuzu is used as a reference group. Horsepower, width, length 
and mpgcity (miles per gallon, city) are in logarithmic form.  
 27
6.4.2. Results of the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis 
Testing collusive assumption among multimarket contact firms 
The application of the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis for the automotive industry 
as described above is complicated by the high concentration ratios and the fact that the 
automotive manufacturers are present in almost every market segment. Thus, one needs to 
find some variation in the multimarket contact among the automotive firms in the US car 
market in order to reduce the number of potential candidates for the multimarket contact 
firms. This could form the “multimarket contact firms coalition” for which the assumption of 
implicit collusive behaviour could be then tested. There could be different criteria for that, for 
example, how long the firm has been present in the market, difference due to the geographical 
market presence, technology difference (e.g., diesel technology), number of markets in which 
a firm is present, etc. 
In the US, the firms that are present in all automotive product markets are Toyota, GM, 
Ford and DaimlerChrysler. The Renault-Nissan group is present in all the markets, except for 
the traditional market segment. 
The criteria that I use for the differentiation of the multimarket contact to point out the 
coalitions of multimarket contact firms are: 1) the presence of the firm in all or almost all 
market segments, 2) multimarket firms with shares with more than 10% in each market 
segment (i.e., considering “influential” rivals, with “spheres of influence”), and 3) the 
combination of the above two criteria. Under the first criterion the collusion possibility 
between GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan groups is tested. Under the 
second criterion, there is a collusion possibility between GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, 
Honda, Hyundai and BMW. Under the third criterion, the collusion is tested between GM, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota. The collusive (cooperative) assumption between GM, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota should be also tested on the basis of the fact that they are 
present in all market segments and have the highest number of multiple contacts. In addition, 
the collusive behaviour between GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler is tested as these firms have 
dominated the US automotive market in general and across separate market segments. In 
addition, Toyota has been argued to be the “heatest” competitor for the US car producers, so 
cooperative behaviour between them could be rather doubtful. For the other firms, I have 
tested different assumptions: competitive, single-product, or multi-product. 
The choice of the above criteria for the multimarket contact differentiation has been based 
on the following arguments. Not only the diversification aspect matters (to support collusion 
due to multimarket contact it is not enough to be present in several markets) but also the 
ability of the firms to use it in the creation of the transferrable slack should be taken into 
account. It is unlikely that the firms with a small market share will be able to generate the 
necessary slack (which is usually fostered by the market concentration), which could be 
transferred to the other markets through the multimarket contact. 
As I have mentioned above, in my estimations I distinguish between multi-product (brand) 
and multi-product (manufacturer group, taking into account the cross-shares in other firms) 
assumptions. Under the latter assumption, a joint profit maximization for Hyundai and Kia; 
GM, Suzuki, Saab and Isuzu; Ford, Mazda, Volvo and Jaguar; Chrysler, Mitsubishi and 
Mercedes; and VW and Audi is assumed, but this led to only slight changes in the markups as 
compared to those under the multi-product (brand) assumption. This is attributed to the low 
market shares of the car brands that are added to the main (parent) brand and the low cross-
price elasticities of demand. 
In accordance with the above assumptions, the ownership matrix θ  is adjusted, and the 
markups could be calculated on the basis of the demand estimates from the first step. Given 
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the markups, the marginal costs under different assumptions could be calculated (see Section 
4.2.1 for more detail). 
The results of the estimated marginal costs equations under selected multimarket contact 
assumptions can be found in Table 9 above. For the best supply-side model selection, the best 
way would be, of course, to get the real estimates of the marginal costs of the automotive 
firms at the model level, and to compare the obtained estimates with those. However this is 
difficult to realize in practice. Not surprisingly, there is not so much publicly available 
information about the margins of the OEMs in the US car market. 
That is why, I move on to the discussion of the results from several statistical procedures (in 
order to conduct robustness checks) to choose the most-preferred supply-side specification 
that best fits the data. Relying on the “goodness-of-fit” of the model may be not the best 
criterion for selecting the best model under these circumstances. As it can be already seen 
from the estimation results (see Table 9), the R-squared is rather similar for all model 
specifications. Below I apply the information criteria (Akaike (AIC), and Bayesian (BIC)), 
sum of squared residuals (SSR), the test for non-nested hypotheses by MacKinnon, White and 
Davidson (1983), and the test for model selection by Rivers and Vuong (2002) to try to 
choose the model that best fits the data. 
The results of the comparison of the information criteria and the sum of squared residuals 
(SSR) as a way to differentiate between the supply side models can be found in Table 10. In 
addition to the single-product, multi-product (brand), multi-product (group) and market 
segment collusion assumptions, the information criteria for the following multimarket contact 
firms coalitions have been estimated: MMC1: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, 
DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan and competitive assumption for the others; 
MMC2: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and 
BMW and competitive assumption for the others; MMC3: collusive assumption for GM, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and competitive assumption for the others; MMC4: 
collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and competitive assumption for the 
others; MMC5: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-
Nissan and single-product assumption for the others; MMC6: collusive assumption for GM, 
Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan and multi-product assumption for the 
others; MMC7: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, 
Hyundai and BMW and single-product assumption for the others; MMC8: collusive 
assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and BMW and multi-
product assumption for the others; MMC9: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, 
DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and single-product assumption for the others; MMC10: collusive 
assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and multi-product assumption for the 
others; MMC11: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and single-product 
assumption for the others; MMC12: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and 
multi-product assumption for the others. 
The model specification that gets the lowest information criteria and SSR should be chosen 
as the supply-side specification that best fits the data. The specifications of the single-product, 
multi-product (brand) and multi-product (manufacturer group) price competition have got the 
lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values. 
However, these values are not that different from the values for the supply-side specification 
under the three multimarket contact assumptions, namely collusive behaviour for Ford, GM 
and DaimlerChrysler and competitive (MMC4), or single-product (MMC11), or multiproduct 
(MMC12) price competition for the other automotive players. That is why one should be 
rather careful in making conclusions on the basis of these information criteria results. The 
comparison of the SSR values shows a similar picture. It should be noted that the SSR in any 
case could not be treated as a sufficient condition for rejecting all the other null hypotheses. 
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Table 10: US light vehicles market: information criteria and sum of squared residuals (SSR) 
for different supply side specifications 
Specifications AIC BIC SSR 
Single-product -539.63 -415.83 9.97 
Multi-product (brand) -535.29 -411.49 10.05 
Multi-product (group) -534.40 -410.59 10.07 
Market segment collusion -306.90 -183.10 15.49 
MMC1 -306.30 -182.50 15.51 
MMC2 -324.57 -200.76 14.98 
MMC3 -345.43 -221.63 14.40 
MMC4 -497.40 -373.60 10.80 
MMC5 -306.56 -182.76 15.50 
MMC6 -306.77 -182.96 15.49 
MMC7 -331.26 -207.45 14.79 
MMC8 -331.34 -207.54 14.79 
MMC9 -347.72 -223.91 14.34 
MMC10 -347.81 -224.00 14.33 
MMC11 -480.08 -356.28 11.16 
MMC12 -478.98 -355.18 11.18 
Source: own estimations  
Note: ‚AIC’ means Akaike Information Criterion, ‚BIC’ stands for Bayesian Information Criterion, and ‚SSR’ denotes sum of squared 
residuals.  
The results of the test for nonnested hypotheses by MacKinnon, White and Davidson 
(1983) can be found in Table 11. The detailed description of the test procedure that I have 
applied can be found in Appendix. At the top of each row there are several modes of market 
conduct (null hypothesis). Each of the columns represents one of the alternative market 
conduct scenarios (alternative hypothesis). The results of the test can be best seen by 
evaluating the columns. It could be seen that when the alternative is MMC4 assumption 
(specification A8), i.e., collusive assumption for the American Big Three GM, Ford and 
DaimlerChrysler and competitive assumption for all other automotive players, all other null 
hypotheses are rejected. That is, this supply-side specification could be arguably the most 
preferred supply-side specification on the basis of this test. 
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Table 11: US light vehicles market: results of the test for the non-nested hypotheses (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983) 
H0/H1 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 
A1  -0.0 0.6 1.7 -6.0 -0.5 -5.3 -2.6 -6.1 -6.1 -0.5 -0.5 -5.4 -5.3 -2.8 -2.7 
A2 0.7  1.4 1.8 -6.4 -0.5 -5.6 -3.0 -6.4 -6.4 -0.5 -0.5 -5.7 -5.6 -3.2 -3.1 
A3 0.1 -1.1  1.4 -6.4 -0.6 -5.6 -3.0 -6.4 -6.4 -0.6 -0.6 -5.7 -5.6 -3.2 -3.1 
A4 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0  -6.0 -0.7 -4.8 -2.6 -6.0 -6.0 -0.7 -0.7 -4.9 -4.9 -2.8 -2.7 
A5 14.8 14.9 15.0 14.7  11.2 6.2 14.4 -0.9 0.8 11.1 11.1 1.8 1.8 8.9 8.9 
A6 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.0 -5.2  -4.9 2.0 -5.3 -5.3 0.0 -0.0 -5.0 -5.0 1.8 1.9 
A7 13.0 13.0 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.5  12.2 -2.3 -2.2 9.5 9.5 -1.1 0.5 12.1 12.1 
A8 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.3 -8.0 2.0 -7.5  -8.0 -8.0 2.0 2.0 -7.6 -7.5 -3.7 -1.3 
A9 14.9 15.0 15.0 14.7 1.3 11.3 6.2 14.4  1.5 11.3 11.3 6.1 6.2 14.2 14.3 
A10 14.8 14.9 15.0 14.7 -0.2 11.3 6.1 14.3 -1.3  11.3 11.3 6.0 6.1 14.1 14.2 
A11 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.1 -5.2 0.1 -4.9 2.0 -5.3 -5.3  -0.1 -4.9 -4.9 1.9 1.9 
A12 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.1 -5.2 0.1 -4.9 2.1 -5.3 -5.3 0.1  -4.9 -4.9 1.9 1.9 
A13 13.0 13.1 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.7 1.5 12.2 -2.4 -2.3 9.7 9.7  1.3 12.1 12.1 
A14 12.9 13.0 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.7 0.0 12.2 -2.4 -2.4 9.7 9.7 -1.2  12.0 12.1 
A15 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 -7.9 2.2 -7.4 4.1 -8.0 -8.0 2.2 2.2 -7.5 -7.4  1.6 
A16 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3 -7.9 2.1 -7.4 1.8 -8.0 -8.0 2.1 2.1 -7.5 -7.4 -1.4  
Source: own estimations 
Note: t-statistics are given in the cells. A1: Single-product. A2: Multi-product (brand). A3: Multi-product (group). A4: Market segment collusion. A5: MMC1. A6: MMC2. A7: MMC3. A8: MMC4. A9: MMC5. A10: 
MMC6. A11: MMC7. A12: MMC8. A13: MMC9. A14: MMC10. A15: MMC11. A16: MMC12. These assumptions are explained in more detail in the text above.  
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The interpretation of the above finding is not so straightforward. Ford, GM and 
DaimlerChrysler have got extensive multimarket contacts with each other, at the same time 
they individually dominate all market segments, so that the collusive behaviour found on the 
basis of the above test could be attributed to the highly concentrated nature of the US light 
vehicles market, which could also foster collusive behaviour. Another interpretation of the 
result could be that the collusive behaviour can be facilitated in case of both multimarket 
contact presence and high market concentration, and it could be even higher than in case of 
only multimarket contact presence, or only high market concentration. Concentration in a 
particular market may foster a slack, which is transferred through the multimarket contact to 
the other markets. 
The above test for non-nested hypotheses is based upon the assumption that one of the 
nested models is correctly specified. It might be, however, not the case. That is why, for 
robustness checks, I have also tried to perform the model selection test by Rivers and Vuong 
(2002). However, I have been unable to get any conclusive results. 
The results from testing procedures are, thus, not quite satisfactory. The test for non-nested 
hypothesis by MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) could give some support for collusive 
behaviour in the US car market. Whether this is a plausible result, is another question which is 
also difficult to answer given the absence of the publicly available cost data. 
It could be argued that the US automobile market has become quite competitive recently. 
As a result, it is difficult to expect healthy profits in the industry. Although this argument is 
quite a natural argument given the current financial situation of the US automobile producers, 
several arguments could be named to support the results of this paper. First, 2001-2003 
period, although quite competitive, is still less competitive than the subsequent and current 
period, when all Big Three American car producers face severe financial problems. 
Furthermore, the markups estimated on the basis of structural models and the markups 
calculated on the basis of the accounting data that appear sometimes in public could be quite 
different.40 In addition, several studies find collusive behaviour in the automobile industry 
notwithstanding the increased competition (e.g., Jaumandreu and Moral, 2006). It would be 
good to conduct a similar analysis for the earlier period of time if the data are available, for 
example, for the time period before 2000, to try to get more support for the findings of this 
paper. 
It should be noted that the multi-product (group) specification, which captures the effect of 
the cross-ownership and the impact of owing several brands by the manufacturer group on the 
firm behaviour has not been found to be the most preferred supply-side specification on the 
basis of the test for the non-nested hypotheses. It seems as if the brands relevant for the US 
car market manufacturer groups include minor brands that may be not of great importance in 
determining the firms’ equilibrium behaviour. 
Testing shock effects 
Testing shock effects to make some inferences about the mutual forbearance hypothesis 
largely depends on the results of the choice of the supply-side specification that best describes 
the data.41 The plausible estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities, mark-ups and, 
consequently, marginal costs are likely to determine the simulation results.  
                                                 
40  Verboven (1997) also in particular argues that the price-cost margins calculated on the basis of the 
accounting data should be treated with caution while evaluating market power in an industry. The 
estimation of an oligopoly model gives an indirect way to determine market power. 
41  The results from these simulations may be to some extent equivalent to those from the estimation of the 
"conjectures", i.e., own- and cross-market reactions in the homogenous goods case. 
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Testing shock effects could probably help me disentangle the effects from concentration 
and multimarket contact on pricing. Two types of shocks can be distinguished: specific-
market shocks (to study multimarket contact effects, to study the impact on other markets) 
and industry-level shocks (to study concentration effects, to see whether there is an impact on 
all markets in the industry). This analysis could be done to study the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis on the basis of the multimarket contact assumption that gets most support in the 
first step. If some other pricing equilibrium turns out to be supported by the data, strategic 
interactions of firms could be still investigated. 
As I have mentioned before, the price war can be approximated by the changes in the 
ownership matrix for a particular market segment. Thus, even if I test, for example, 
multimarket contact assumption at the firm level, I can simulate what happens when the firm 
behaviour in one market segment becomes more competitive and whether this will influence 
the firm(s)’ behaviour in the other market segments as well as where these changes will be 
most pronounced. 
On the basis of the above described simulations in practice, I have failed to derive some 
conclusive evidence. I could perhaps derive more reasonable simulation results on the basis of 
the random coefficients framework for the demand side. 
7. Concluding remarks 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the automotive industry, which 
concentrates on studying various sources of the market power in an extensive way: fewness (a 
few competitors and large concentration), differentiation (products have unique features), 
market-specific collusion, and collusion due to the multimarket contact presence, and which 
exclusively concentrates on studying the firms’ equilibrium interactions in the US car market. 
The mutual forbearance hypothesis is tested in the industry characterized by extensive 
multimarket contact, however, in which it is not so easy to test for the multimarket contact 
effects on collusive behaviour.  
It has been found that multimarket contact may influence competition in the automobile 
markets and increase the firms’ strategic interdependence. This effect is, however, difficult to 
disentangle from the effect of the market concentration in the US automobile market on the 
firm behaviour. It should be noted that in general the empirical studies find it problematic to 
distinguish between internal (e.g., concentration) and external (e.g., multimarket contact) 
effects on the firm behaviour. The model specifications of single-product and multiproduct 
firm behaviour for the car producers have been found to be among the most preferred supply-
side model specifications on the basis of the information criteria and sum of squared residuals, 
but not on the basis of the test for non-nested hypotheses. The test by MacKinnon, White and 
Davidson (1983) showed some support for the specification where GM, Ford and 
DaimlerChrysler behave in a cooperative way, and all other automotive players behave 
competitively. On the basis of the model selection test by Rivers and Vuong (2002) it was 
difficult to choose the best supply-side specification. Therefore, one should be careful in 
applying a particular statistical test and interpreting its results. It seems worthwhile to 
compare the results from several testing procedures as robustness checks for the “best” chosen 
supply-side specification. 
The major novelty of this paper compared to the other empirical studies on the mutual 
forbearance hypotheses is the specification of coalitions of multimarket contact firms and 
testing collusive assumptions among them. The test has been applied in a non-traditional set-
up as compared to the “traditional” one for such studies industries and markets (e.g., banking, 
or airlines). This paper has rather concentrated on testing the existence of the significant and 
positive impact of multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. Namely, it has been tested that 
 33
the firms behave perfectly collusively because of multiple market presence. The degree of 
collusive behaviour is assumed to be the same in all the markets where the rivals meet each 
other. The precise quantification of the multimarket contact effect on the firm behaviour is 
difficult on the basis of this approach. 
The results of this paper may be improved in the future by estimating more flexible 
substitution patterns, which may lead to the more plausible mark-ups and marginal costs 
estimates, and probably more reasonable results of simulating collusive behaviour due to 
multimarket contact. A less competitive time period could be considered using the same 
approach. It would also be worthwhile to have the data for a longer time period, where there 
may be periods of collusive and more competitive behaviour among the multimarket contact 
firms. 
Some policy implications may be derived for conducting competition policy. The possible 
anticompetitive effects of the multimarket contact will have to be taken into account while 
setting up the antitrust policy (e.g., there may be implications for the entry of new firms), and 
assessing the effects of the conglomerate mergers. If the markets are strategically linked, then 
policy makers should take into account both direct effects of their regulatory actions in one 
particular market, and indirect effects in the other markets. The sole market assumption by the 
regulators may, thus, be irrelevant. The measurement of the competitive pressure in an 
industry can be more complicated than it could be inferred from the concentration ratio, or 
Herfindahl index, if accounting for the multimarket contact effects. 
To sum up, the results of the study allow the verification of the theoretical predictions about 
the mutual forbearance hypothesis to a certain extent, give empirical evidence on the 
intermarket relationships of the multiproduct firms and contribute to the literature on the 
market power. Furthermore they help to explore the competitive interactions in the 
automotive industry, thus gaining a deeper understanding of the pricing behaviour in the 
automobile market which constantly receives a lot of public interest. 
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9. Appendix. Tests for non-nested hypotheses 
9.1. MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) test for non-nested hypotheses 
These tests fall under the category of “artificial testing”.42 Two non-nested models are 
embedded into a more general artificial model. MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) 
derive the test for the linear case (J-test), the non-linear case (P-test), with transformed 
dependent variables and in case of the IV estimation. 
I can re-write the below pricing equation, which is derived from the first-order conditions 
and can be decomposed into marginal cost and markup: 
1p c s−= +Ω                                                                                                                            (29) 
in the following way: 
1p w D sγ λ ω −= + + +Ω                                                                                                          (30) 
where w  are product characteristics, D  are firm dummies, ω  are unobserved product 
characteristics. The quality-adjusted prices will then be: 
1p w D sπ γ ω λ −= − − = +Ω                                                                                                    (31) 
The null hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
0 0 0 0:H p wγ π ε= + +                                                                                                              (32) 
The alternative hypothesis can be written down as: 
1 1 1 1:H p wγ π ε= + +                                                                                                               (33) 
If the model under 0H  is a true model, then there should be no correlation between its 
residuals and the difference between the fitted values of 0H  and 1H . w , i.e., product 
characteristics, will be the same in case of both models, thus, the quality-adjusted prices 0π  
and 1π  will be the fitted values of interest. 
The idea of the P-test is to evaluate whether 0p π−   is orthogonal to 1 0π π−  . For that 
purpose, the artificial regression should be run: 
0 1 0( ) ( )p wa b uπ π π− = + − +     
where a  and b  are the parameters to be estimated. The pairs of models are compared on the 
basis of the t-statistic, which is normally distributed. 
                                                 
42  This test has been in particular applied by Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Verboven (2002). 
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9.2. Rivers and Vuong (2002) model selection test 
Assume the following cost specification: 43 
exp( )h hj j jc w γ ω= +                                                                                                                  (34) 
Taking the logarithms on both sides I get: 
ln h hj j jc ω γ ω= +                                                                                                                       (35) 
or 
1ln( )j j jp s w γ ω−−Ω = +                                                                                                         (36) 
It is assumed that two models h  and h′  are tested against each other: 
1( )h hj jp c s
−= + Ω                                                                                                                     (37) 
and 
1( )h hj jp c s
′ ′−= + Ω                                                                                                                    (38) 
The lack-of-fit criteria are defined for both models as: 
2 1 21 1min min ( ) min (ln( ) )h hn j j jQ p s wn n
ϖ γ−= = −Ω −∑ ∑                                                   (39) 
The null hypothesis is defined as the two models are asymptotically equivalent when 
0 : lim( ) 0
h h
n nn
H Q Q ′→∞ − =                                                                                                             (40) 
The two alternative hypotheses are that model h  performs asymptotically better than model 
h′ , or that model h′  performs asymptotically better than model h . 
The test statistic is then calculated in the following way: 
{ }2 h hn n nnT Q Qσ ′= −                                                                                                                  (41) 
where ,h hn nQ Q
′ are the sample-of-lack criteria that are estimated for the models h  and h′  at the 
estimated parameters values of the model, and 2σ  is the estimated value of the variance of the 
difference in the lack-of-fit. The test statistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. 
If the standardized difference is statistically negative that implies that the model h  is better 
than model h′ . If the test statistic is large and positive that means that the model h′  is better 
than model h . 
 
                                                 
43  Vuong-type tests have been in particular applied by Jaumandreu and Lorences (2002), Bonnet et al. 
(2006), and Jaumandreu and Moral (2006). 
